Associate Professor Neil Mehta is primarily a philosopher of mind who dabbles in metaphysics and epistemology. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 2008 and 2012 respectively, and an undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College in 2005.
In his spare time, Assoc Prof Mehta reads graphic novels, drinks single-malt whisky, and trains for salsa performances.
Assoc Prof Mehta’s research focuses on the nature of consciousness and perception. He holds that consciousness is an immediate awareness of the essences of external properties, while perception is a representation of particulars (but not of their essences).
Review of Michael Madary’s book Visual Phenomenology, Philosophical Review, forthcoming
“Phenomenal, normative, and other explanatory gaps: A general diagnosis,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2017 (online)
“Can grounding characterize fundamentality?,” Analysis, 2017
“On the generality of experience: A reply to French and Gomes,” with co-author Todd Ganson, Philosophical Studies, 2016
“Knowledge and other norms for assertion, action, and belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015/2016 (online/print)
“The limited role of particulars in phenomenal experience,” Journal of Philosophy, 2014
“Beyond transparency: the spatial argument for experiential externalism,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013
“Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?,” Philosophical Studies, 2013
“How to explain the explanatory gap,” Dialectica, 2013
“General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach,” with George Mashour (neuroscientist/anesthesiologist) as second author, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, 2013
“Exploring subjective representationalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2012
Philosophy and Political Thought 1 and 2
Why Be Moral?
Can Consciousness Be Explained?