Professor Neil Mehta is a philosopher of mind and epistemologist. He received his MA and PhD from the University of Michigan in 2008 and 2012 respectively, and an undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College in 2005.
As a philosopher, Professor Mehta thinks that consciousness is made up almost entirely of external properties; that perceptual experience has a normative role grounded in its proper function; and that knowledge sets the standard of epistemic success, but not of epistemic permissibility.
During his spare time, Professor Mehta reads graphic novels, drinks single-malt whisky, and wonders what it is like to be his dog.
Professor Mehta’s research interests are in Philosophy of mind and epistemology.
“The limited role of particulars in phenomenal experience”, Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming*
“Beyond transparency: the spatial argument for experiential externalism”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013*
“Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?”, Philosophical Studies, 2013
“How to explain the explanatory gap”, Dialectica, 2013
“General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach”, with George Mashour (neuroscientist/anesthesiologist) as second author, Frontiers in
Consciousness Research, 2013
“Exploring subjective representationalism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2012
Philosophy and Political Thought 1 and 2